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NOTES
SECTION 301(A) OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION':
ARTICLE III of the Constitution delineates both the sources and the limita-
tions 1 of the jurisdiction which Congress may confer upon the lower United
States courts.2 In the main, this jurisdiction is confined to cases involving
diversity of citizenship and cases "arising under" the Constitution or laws of
the United States.' The most recent Congressional exercise within these nar-
row constitutional limits has yielded Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 4 under which suits for violations of labor
contracts 5 covering "employees in an industry affecting [interstate] corn-
*Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., lst Sess. (June 23, 1947).
1. Alexander Hamilton, after observing that the judicial power of federal courts
comprehends only cases specified in Article III of the Constitution, stated that "ihe ex-
pression of those cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot ex-
tend their jurisdiction; because, the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the
specification would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority."
THE FEDERALIST, No. 83 at 460. (Goldwin Smith ed. 1901).
The elasticity of Congressional power to bestow jurisdiction upon United States courts
is contractile only. Thus, a federal statute may withhold jurisdiction of controversies
enumerated in the Constitution or withdraw jurisdiction previously granted, but it may, not
increase extant jurisdiction to overflow the constitutional bench mark. See Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); The Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575
(U.S. 1869); Behlert v. James Foundation of New York, 60 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
55 YALE L. J. 600 (1946), 46 COL. L. REv. 125 (1946).
2. In every case coming before statutory federal courts, jurisdiction depends upon an
act of Congress, as well as the Constitution. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 258 (1944); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577
(U.S. 1873); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506 (U.S. 1813). For a comlilation of cases
illustrating the dependence of jurisdiction in the federal district courts upon the will of
Congress, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86, n.22 (1932).
3. For the specialized jurisdictional subject matter, such as admiralty and ambassa-
dorial cases, see U. S. CONST., Art. III, § 2.
4. "Sec. 301. (a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong.,
lstSess. (June 23, 1947).
5. Collective labor contracts constitute the predominant kind of labor agreement
since widespread unionization throughout industry. For a tracing of the checkered career
of enforceable rights in such collective contracts, see 1 TELLER, LABOR DisPUTES AND COL-
LEcTIVE BARGAINING § 154 et seg. (1940); Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising from Collce-
live Labor Contracts, 3 Mo. L. REv. 252 (1938); Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective
Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 Micn. L. REv. 1109 (1941); Wallace, Jurisdic.
lion of the Courts to Decide Questions Arising Out of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 11
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merce" may now be brought in any United States district court by employ-
ers and labor organizations-and perhaps individual employees -- regard-
less of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Since the
diversity requirement has been abandoned in this potentially expansive
grant of jurisdiction, the constitutionality of Section 301(a) must be predi-
cated on the presence of a federal question 7 in suits over labor contract
violations.
Still furnishing the constitutional touchstone for statutes conferring
federal question jurisdiction is the early case of Osborn v. Banh of the United
States." In this case Chief Justice Marshall upheld one of the first Congres-
sional grants of special 9 federal question jurisdiction-a clause in the in-
Mo. L. REv. 62 (1946); Witmer, Colleclire Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE L.J
195 (1938).
6. Congressional analyses of Section 301(a) suggest on the one hand that suits can be
properly instituted by employers and labor organizations only; on the other, that em-
ployees themselves can initiate action. 93 Cong. Rec. 3734 (April 17, 1947). See p. 637
infra.
7. For extensive consideration of the troublesome nature of a federal question and the
leading Supreme Court cases on this point, see Chadboum and Levin, Original Jurisdiction
of Federal Questions, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdic-
tion and Section 5, 18 TULANE L. REV. 263 (1943); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal
Question," 16 TULA.NE L.'REv. 362 (1942); Willard, Mien Does a Case "Arise" Under Federal
Laws?, 45 Am. L. REV. 373 (1911); Comment, 40 ILL. L. REv. 387 (1945).
Definition of a "federal question" should be related to the context in which the "arising
under" criterion is employed. Of primal origin is the constitutional "arising under" phrase
which marks the bounds for all Congressional grants of federal question jurisdiction. Sec-
ondly, implementing the constitutional prescription are several jurisdictional statutes in
which Congress has used the "arising under" terminology: 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U.S.C.
§41(4) (1940) (laws relating to slave trade); 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), as amended, 45 STAT.
1475 (1929), 28 U.S.C. § 41(5) (1940) (internal revenue, customs and tonnage laws); 36
STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41(6) (1940) (postal laws); 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U.S.C.
§ 41(7) (1940) (patent, copyright and trade-mark laws); 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), as amended,
38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C. § 41(8) (1940) (laws regulating commerce); 36 SrT. 1093
(1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41(22) (1940) (immigration and contract labor laws); 36 STAT. 1093
(1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41(23) (1940) (laws to protect commerce against restraints and monop-
olies); 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1)(1940), and 36 STAT. 1094 (1911),
28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940) (original and removal jurisdiction of "general" federal questions).
The meaning attributed to the statutory federal question prescription determines the
validity of federal jurisdiction in cases where a plaintiff alleges a cause of action under the
authority of a statutory "arising under" grant. To resolve this validity, courts have applied
the "disputed construction or effect rule," under the terms of which, ". . . a right or im-
munity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.... The right or immunity must be such
that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one con-
struction or effect, and defeated if they receive another." Cardozo, J., in Gully -. First
National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936). This interpretation accorded the
statutory "arising under" language seems irrelevant to a determination of the constitutiorality
within the "arising under" terms of Article III of a jurisdictional statute like Section 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
8. 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
9. Federal question grants of jurisdiction are divided into two categories: the "general"
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corporation statute of the Bank of the United States enabling it "to sue and
be sued . . . in any circuit court of the United States." 10 The significance
of this decision in formulating a rule for testing future exercises of Con-
gressional power to bestow jurisdiction was two-fold. First, Marshall con-
firmed the capacity of the Bank to sue by pointing out that the corporate
charter, a law of the United States, gave the Bank "every faculty which it
possesse[d]," including "[t]he power to acquire rights . .. to transact busi-
ness . . . to make contracts . . .and to sue on those contracts. . . ." 1
The jurisdictional grant of the charter derived its validity expressly from
the federal color displayed in all of the Bank's activities by virtue of the
federal charter. Having found federal rights underlying the grant, Marshall
then turned his ear to the contention that some suits involving the Bank
would not actually "arise under" federal law because they would not pre-
sent the federal question of the Bank's right to sue. Scotching this argument
with a comprehensiveness uncalled for by the case before him," Marshall
postulated the sweeping doctrine that, after the fundamental federal char-
acter of any of the Bank's activities was once established, the bare existence
of the jurisdictional clause invested federal courts with power to hear ally
suit concerning the Bank.
Therefore, upon Marshall's initial principle, the existence of a substantive
foundation in federal law, seemingly hinges the constitutionality of a juris-
dictional grant. Back of all such grants must lie a cause of action in federal
law: to wit, a statute creating substantive rights which may be asserted in
the federal court. Thus, in the Osborn case, the omnipresent bank charter
imbued all of the Bank's transactions with a federal nature. Similarly, be-
neath the permission to sue found in the Federal Employers' Liability Act 13
and the Fair Labor Standards Act 14 rests the separately conferred statutory
cause of action in the injured " or the underpaid 11 employee plaintiff.
grant (36 STAT. 1091 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940)) and the numerous
"special" grants in § 24 of the Judicial Code (36 STAT. 1091-4 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1940)) and various other federal statutes. Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
falls into the latter classification.
10. 3 STAT. 269 (1816).
11. 9 Vheat. 738, 823 (U.S. 1824).
12. See Chadbourn and Levin, supra note 7, at 648; Shulman and Jaegerman, Some
Jurisdictional Limitation on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393,404-5 (1936).
13. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1940). The jurisdictional clause is
remedial only; it creates no right to recover for injuries in itself. Teel v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. Co. of Virginia, 204 Fed. 918 (C.C.A. 6th 1913).
14. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1940).
15. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1940).
16. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1940). Section 216(b) includes both the
substantive cause of action and the jurisdictional grant, but each is set forth in a distinct
and explicit sentence. "Obviously the appellant would not have been entitled to file this
action if it were not for the enactment of the statute which creates the cause of action. Sec-
tion 16(b), Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title 29, § 216(b), U.S.C. .. ." Robertson v.
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It is the want of a clearly denominated federal right to the enforcement of
labor contracts which arouses doubt concerning the constitutionality of
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. On its surface, this section does no
more than specify a forum for a designated category of litigation,17 and
examination of the rest of the Taft-Hartley Act - and other federal labor
Argus Hosiery Mills, Inc., 121 F.2d 285, 286 (C.C.A. 6th 1941), cerl. denied, 314 U.S. 681
(1941).
17. Senator Taft, co-sponsor of the 1947 Labor Act, stated that "it]he purpose of title
III [including Section 301(a) ] is to give the employer and the employee the right to go to
the Federal courts to bring a suit to enforce the terms of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment ... ." 93 Cong. Rec. 4265 (April 28, 1947). The Senator's statement clearly indi-
cates, as do the words of Section 301(a), an intent to allow federal courts to hear actions in-
volving labor contracts. But it does little to answer the crucial question whether these
actions are intended to have a substantive basis in federal law.
Perhaps some light is cast on this question by the statement of Senator Murray, out-
spoken foe of the Taft-Hartley legislation, that "[t]he Federal courts have always had juris-
diction to entertain suits for breach of collective-bargaining contracts, and have a%arded
money damages where the amount in controversy fulfills the present $3,000 requirement and
diversity of citizenship exists.
"Every district court would still be required to look to State substantive law to deter-
mine the question of violation. This section does not, therefore, create a new cause of ac-
tion, but merely makes the existing remedy available to more persons by removing the
requirements of amount in controversy and of diversity of citizenship where interstate
commerce is affected." 93 Cong. Rec. 4153 (April 25, 1947). Senator Murray's substitute
proposal for the Taft bill permitted suits in federal courts only if diversity of citizenship and
jurisdictional amount were shown. 93 Cong. Rec. 5118 (May 12, 1947).
Subsequent to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Murray and Representa-
tive Hartley, co-author of the bill, expressed contrary views as to the existence of federal
labor contract rights supporting Section 301(a). According to Senator Murray, ". ..the
failure of Congress to have vested any substantive rights in collective labor agreements
automatically precludes Congress from extending the judicial power of the United States
to cases involving the breach of such agreements in the absence of diversity of citizenship.
...If under the apparent theory of Section 301(a) Congress can authorize federal courts
to hear and try cases between persons in the same state, simply because some aspects of the
case may affect interstate commerce (even though Congress in the exercise of its commerce
powers did not create a substantive right), then it would be possible for Congress virtually
completely to deprive states of their sovereign, judicial powers." Communication to YAE
LAW JoUmaL from Senator James E. Murray, Nov. 5, 1947. Representative Hartley, on
the other hand, believes ". . . that Congress did obviate any constitutional doubts as to the
liability for any loss, damage or injury caused by the violation of union agreements in the
enactment of Section 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947." Communication
to YALE LAW JouNAL from Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr., Nov. 5, 1947.
- 18. Possibly Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, forbidding the termination or
modification of a collective-bargaining contract unless certain procedural steps are pursued,
might be urged as the source of a federal right in labor contract enforcement. "When a
federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences
of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless
federal questions. . . ." Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 US. 173, 176
(1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-1 (1940).
However, Section 8(d) seems only to define an "unfair labor practice" enjoinable by the
National Labor Relations Board rather than to create in parties to a labor contract any
private rights in enforcing the bargain. Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in
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legislation 19 discloses no statutory language creating unequivocal substan-
tive rights in the enforcement of labor contracts. 0 But a constitutional
appraisal of Section 301(a) cannot be concluded by discovering that there
Section 8(d) is a violation of "the duty to bargain collectively," which constitutes an "unfair
labor practice." The National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction "to prevent any per-
son from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce."
Section 10(a). Furthermore, it would seem that the Board, rather than the courts, is the
exclusive remedial agency for hearing a complaint arising out of a contract termination or
modification -unlawful under Section 8(d), although, it is true, Section 10(a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act does omit the "exclusive" characterization of the Board's jurisdiction found in
the Wagner Act. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 49 STAT. 1921 (1936), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1940). Section 10(a), provides only that the "power [of the Board] shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise," implying that grievances which are termed unfair labor practices
may be entertained as ordinary contract violations by'state and/or federal tribunals other
than the Board. This clause might well have been intended to resolve affirmatively a ques-
tion which arose under the Wagner Act: namely, the existence of a private action for breach
of contract under state law which at the same time would be considered an unfair labor
practice within the jurisdiction of the Board. See National Labor Relations Board v. New-
ark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, 268 (C.C.A. 3d 1941), cerl. denied, 314 U.S. 693
(1941) (decreeing enforcement of Board order that employer reinstate employee who had
been discharged because of her union activities, declaring that the "existence of such a
private right [to a possible action for wrongful discharge in a New Jersey court] . .. in no
way affects the public right or the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to enforce it.").
19. Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060-9 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1940);
National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1940); Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70-3 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1940); Railway Labor Act, 44
STAT. 577-87 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1940).
20. For discussion of the effect of Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, setting forth
the procedure for modification of collective-bargaining agreements, see note 18 supra.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the only rights in a collective labor contract
enforceable in the federal courts are those whose existence have been determined by the
National Labor Relations Board; none springs from the contract itself. ". . . [W]e find no
provision in the [National Labor Relations] act which can be construed as intending to create
rights for employees which can be enforced in federal courts independently of action by the
National Labor Relations Board." Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F.2d 450, 454 (C.C.A. 7th
1938) (suit by one union local to enjoin interference with subsisting collective contract by
another local; dismissed for failure to state cause of action under Wagner Act and Norris-
La Guardia Act). "There is no intimation in the [National Labor Relations] act that,
merely because an employer has entered into a contract with a majority union, Congress
assumed to vest jurisdiction in United States courts to protect or safeguard the integrity of
such contract. . . . IN]o proceedings between employer and employee under the Wagner
Act are entitled to any protection by the court until some affirmative action has been taken
by the Labor Board. . . ." Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 609, 610
(D. Minn. 1937) (bill by employer to enjoin interference by striking minority of employees
with labor agreement effected with bargaining representative of majority of employees; dis-
missed for absence of substantial federal question).
Similarly, suits claiming violation of employment contracts under the Railway Labor
Act have been dismissed for want of a federal qttestion on the theory that the right to sue
arises, not from federal statutory provisions, but from the contract obligation dependent
upon state law. Barnhart v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 128 F.2d 709 (C.C.A. 4th 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 671 (1942) (discharged employees asked for injunction, accounting, and
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are no explicit labor contract rights in federal law, for it seems probable
that federal substantive rights may be distilled by implication from the
grant of jurisdiction. Read broadly, the language in Section 301(a) supports
the inference that parties to labor contracts shall be federally liable for any
loss, damage, or injury caused by violation of such contracts, so that a clause
remedial on its face might be pregnant with the federal right necessary to
non-diversity jurisdiction. That Congress, acting under the commerce
clause of the Constitution, could affix rights and liabilities in the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement in industries "affecting commerce" cannot
be seriously doubted. 21 Moreover, in the words of Section 1(b), the Taft-
Hartley Act purports "to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce." 22 The absurd specta-
cle of a suitor in a federal court without any federal rights to vindicate
points up the strong likelihood that Congress intended Section 301(a) to
serve as a procedural method of creating those substantive rights.
determination of status under breached employment contract); MNalone v. Gardner, 62 F.2d
15 (C.C.A. 4th 1932) (representative of one group of engineers requested injunction to re-
strain another group of engineers from influencing railroad employer to breach seniority
contracts with former group); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.
Pa. 1947), re-ersing inconsistent parts, 68 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Pa. 1946) (employees sued to
recover extra pay under contract authorizing such compensation for performance of special
duties); Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 56 F. Supp. 634 (\.D.N.Y. 1944) (employer
sought interpretation of contract in declaratory judgment action); McDermott v. New York
Cent. R_ Co., 32 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (employee sued for damages for breach of
employment contract).
The Railway Labor Act provides that "no carrier . . . shall change the rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions of its employees . . . as embodied in agreements" except in
the manner permitted by the agreement or by written notice similar to that required in
Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1186
(1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1940). No individual contract rights have been derived from this
mandate. In two recent companion cases before the Supreme Court, Negro railroad em-
ployees sued under the Railway Labor Act for a declaratory judgment, injunction and
damages arising out of discriminatory contracts effected between the bargaining reprezenta-
tive for their crafts and their employers. These contracts amended existing collective bar-
gaining agreements, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of certain seniority rights. The Court
held that such cases did present a federal question entertainable by federal courts. How-
ever, the federal question was predicated not on the existence of federal contract rights stem-
ming from the "no change" clause of the Act, but on the rights of the employees under the
provision of the Act dealing with the creation of exclusive bargaining representatives. Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). For judgment on the merits in the
Tunstall case, enjoining the enforcement of the discriminatory seniority contracts and
awarding damages, see 69 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 289 (C.C.A. 4th
1947), cert. denied, 16 U.S.L. WVEaE 1391 (Dec. 15, 1947).
21. Sections 1(b), 8(d), 301(a), 301(b), and 303(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act make men-
tion of the "interstate commerce" features of the Act. For other jurisdictional grants
springing from the regulatory power of Congress over commerce, see 52 STAT. 1069 (1938),
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1940) (suits under Fair Labor Standards Act); 35 STAT. 66 (1903), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § S6 (1940) (suits under Federal Employers Liability Act).
22. See Representative Hartley's remarks, note 17 supra.
1948]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Tempering the deduction from Section 301(a) of implied federal rights in
the 'enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements is the fact that a Con-
gress so minded could easily have made explicit statement that there shall
henceforth be federal liability for violation of a labor contract. Had Con-
gress merely declared this indispensable liability, it could, with constitu-
tional impunity, have passed the burden of expatiation along to the courts.
Indeed, the elaboration of a federal law of labor contracts would probably
be a job of too prodigious magnitude for the legislature, for it would entail,
at the least, anticipation and description of "violations," defenses to suits
for breach, and "contract" itself-in short, a superimposition of federal on
top of state, doctrines as to labor contracts.2" If the failure of Congress to
elaborate a federal policy toward labor agreements 24 can be excused, it
23. Congress may have intended in Section 301(a) to secure for the future the applica-
tion of a uniform substahtive law of labor contracts. However, even presupposing that
federal rights in such contracts could be extracted from the Taft-Hartley Act, it is dubious
how much uniformity would follow from the jurisdictional grant in Section 301(a). In cases
basing federal jurisdiction upon a federal question, federal courts have not been bound to
apply state substantive law under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). Assuming the trial of Section 301(a) actions is con-
ducted without reference to state law, two questions arise. Did Congress through the
medium of Section 301(a) mean to preempt the field of substantive law dealing with labor
contract rights? If it did, can state courts still hear suits involving labor agreements affect-
ing interstate commerce, or is jurisdiction exclusive in the federal courts? For a discussion
of the indices of whether federal law has preempted state law in a given field, see R.F.C. v,
Central Republic Trust Co., 17 F. Supp. 263, 294 (N.D. I1. 1936), aff'd sub nom, R.F.C. v.
McCormick, 102 F.2d 305 (C.C.A. 7th 1939), cer. denied, 308 U.S. 558 (1939).
If jurisdiction of state courts continues, a further question would arise: would state
courts be governed by a federal law of labor contracts? Uniformity of substantive law
would obtain under preemptive circumstances, for the United States Supreme Court would
be arbiter of the law applied in all courts. However, the absence of a detailed doctrine of
federal labor contract obligations would relegate state forums from time to time to the
predicament of not knowing what the controlling federal law is during the interim before
federal courts have declared it-a dilemma similar to the one which frequently confronts
federal courts searching for state law under the Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins doctrine.
But the lack of expression of Congressional intent to accomplish preemption and the
provision in Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act that nothing in the Act shall supersede
state laws on closed and union shops militate strongly against the possible interpretation
of Section 301(a) as a device for replacing state substantive law. Assuming Congress did
not intend to preempt the labor contract field, cases could be brought in the state courts
under Section 301(a), or under common law breach of contract principles. In an action
based on the substantive contract law of the state, a party might often get a ruling quite
different from what he could expect in a federal court or in the same state court sitting in a
case cast under the Taft-Hartley Act. Furthermore, common law breach of contract cases
could not reach the United States Supreme Court on appeal through the state courts for
want of a federal question. See REv. STAT. §§ 690, 709 (1875), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 344
(1940). Thus, in place of uniformity of substantive law, two separate bodies of labor con-
tract law might develop simultaneously.
24. It is possible that Congress meant in Section 301(a) to achieve uniformity in the
suability of labor unions as well as in the application of substantive law. Herman W.
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seems that the absence of a concise statement of liability underlying Sec-
tion 301(a) might equally well be overlooked as chargeable to the inarticu-
lateness of the draftsmen rather than to the lack of Congressional intent to
enact federal rights in labor agreements.
Finally, in choosing between the inferential or the "face value" approach
to Section 301(a), forethought toward the consequences of upholding the
statute upon the volume of business of both trial and appellate courts of the
United States would not be amiss.2 5 For example, a construction of the
statute which permitted suits by individual employees, as well as employers
and labor organizations, might well weigh against judicial approval of Sec-
tion 301(a) because of the possible surge of suits which would thereby be
authorized. 6 More generally, the reluctance of courts to increase their
Steinkraus, appearing on behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce at preliminary
committee hearings on the Taft-Hartley bill, contrasted the ready accountability of em-
ployers for breach of labor contracts with the immunity enjoyed by labor unions through
state procedural quirks. Hearings of the House Commiee on Education and Labor, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., v. 4, p. 2532 (1947). Absent statutory authorization to sue, the common
law prevails in the several states that labor unions are not amenable to suit as such because
of their status as unincorporated voluntary associations which have no juristic being. 2
TELLER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 462.
In view of the express provision in Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act rendering
labor unions suable in "courts of the United States," it is extremely doubtful that Congress
purported to go so far as to make unions suable in all courts, state as well as federal.
25. The protest of overburdening an increasingly busy federal judiciary often follows
on the heels of proposed extensions of federal jurisdiction. Dissenting from a recent judicial
broadening of bankruptcy jurisdiction, Justice Frankfurter revealed some alarm over the
undesirable prospect of swollen federal dockets: "It is a truism, but vital to keep in mind
that increase in the quantity of the Court's business affects the quality of its work. . . . If
the Court works under too much pressure, because of the excessive volume of its business,
the process of study and reflection indispensable for wise judgment is bound to suffer."
Williams v. Austrian, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1462, n. 7 (1947).
Overtaxing the judiciary is a practical consideration which may militate against valida-
tion of Section 301(a). Senator Murray, visualizing that Section 301 will impose an unneces-
sary load on federal judges, remarked that "ithe Abandonment of the present amount in
controversy and diversity of citizenship requirements is an unwise departure from existing
law, which would impose a needlessly increased burden upon the Federal courts, already
weighted down with litigation .... Although the Federal courts appear to be handling
this increased [citing figures previously mentioned] load as efficiently as possible, it is obvious
that there are human limitations upon the capacity of present staffs and that constant in-
crease in litigation can only be met by an increase in the number of judges and court per-
sonnel, with corresponding increases in the cost of government. The alternative would be
a break-down in our judicial system." 93 Cong. Rec. 4153 (April 25, 1947). Of course, in
evaluating the merit of this forensic pragmatism, it is well to remember that the skill of the
arbitrator of labor disputes has lessened somewhat the worry about flooding the federal
judiciary with litigation concerning collective agreements.
26. The ambiguity of Congressional intent to permit or deny suits by individual em-
ployees has been indicated in note 6 supra. Assuming that federal courts should decide to
uphold Section 301(a), and yet limit the section's potential expansion of federal jurisdiction
by barring suits by individual employees, an intent to bar such individual suits could argu-
ably be supported by the statutory language: thus, if in the phrase "(suits for violation of
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dockets, 21 except where Congress has clearly spoken, could contribute to a
restrictive reading of the instant statute.2s However, a policy based on ad-
ministrative efficiency should not in itself preclude the recognition of a new-
born class of litigation if such litigation is a vehicle for discharging obliga-
tions fixed in federal law.?
contracts between an employer and a labor organization .. .or between any such labor
organizations," the "between" phrases are held to modify "suits," application of the cx.
pressio unilis est exclusio alterius rule of statutory construction would limit potential
litigants to "employers" and "labor organizations."
27. For judicial limitations upon the ambit of federal jurisdiction, sed Indianapolis v.
Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (doctrine of realignment of parties in testing
diversity); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (practical discouragement of liti-
gants from trying to obtain different results in a federal forum from remedies in state court);
Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (limitation of "arising under"
jurisdiction to cases which turn on a construction of the Constitution or a federal law);
White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930) (requirement of federal question in
plaintiff's complaint well pleaded); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U.S. 1806) (re-
quirement of complete diversity of citizenship in diversity jurisdiction); Georgia Power Co,
v. Hudson, 49 .F.2d 66 (C.C.A. 4th 1931) (prohibition of joinder of separate causes of action
to meet jurisdictional amount). For a discussion of recent Supreme Court restrictions on
federal jurisdiction, see Note, 53 YALE L. J. 788 (1944).
See also statutes aimed at narrowing federal jurisdiction on the trial level: 43 STAT.
941 (1925), 28 U.S.C. § 42 (1940) (exclusion of jurisdiction over suits by or against federal
corporations unless more than 50% of capital therein owned by United States); 36 STAT.
1094 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940) (permission of removal from state to federal
court in diversity cases to non-resident defendant only); 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U.S.C.
§ 80 (1940) (provision for dismissal or remand of collusive suits which do not really involve
controversy within federal jurisdiction); 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1)
(1940) (requirement for over $3,000 jurisdictional amount and prohibition of certain suits
by assignees of choses in action). For judicial recognition of the statutory trend in the past
half century to delimit federal jurisdiction, see Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25,36 (1934).
28. Invalidation of Section 301(a) might issue in part from the many thorny problems
of workability presented by this clause. Regarding the ambiguity of who has a standing to
sue, see notes 6 and 26 supra. What remedy a litigant may seek by virtue of Section 301(a)
is also open to surmise. The mention in Section 301(b) of enforceability of "any money
judgment" against a union denotes that damages is one form of relief contemplated by Sec-
tion 301(a). House debate reveals that declaratory judgment suits were also meant to come
within its purview. See remarks of Representatives Barden and Hartley, 93 Cong. Rec. 3734
(April 17, 1947). But legislative materials are mute upon the propriety of including injunc-
tions within the description "suits for violations of contracts." If "violations" include ac-
tivities which are designated as labor disputes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the use of Sec-
tion 301(a) to supply injunctive redress would amount to an amendment of the anti-injunc-
tion provisions of that Act. See 47 STAT. 70-3 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1940). But
it is at least questionable whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act need be considered as amended
by Section 301 (a) in order thaat an injunction issue for violation of a collective labor agree-
ment, for the courts have divided on the question of the applicability of anti-injunction
statutes to such suits. For a collection of the opposite lines of cases, see Note, 156 A.L.R.
652, 678 et seg. (1945). The looseness and vagueness which characterize Section 301(a) is
puzzling in contrast with the concrete provision in Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act for
damage suits arising out of secondary boycott practices, which are outlined with clarity in
subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(4).
29. Compare the remarks of Judge John J. Parker, decrying movements to limit federal
[Vol. 57
NOTES
No thought process, breakdown of extant statutory grants of federal
jurisdiction, nor legislative token, exhibits categorically the federal rights
in labor contracts essential to sustain Section 301(a). Congress has plainly
shirked the definitiveness which should distinguish a statute expanding the
restricted field of federal jurisdiction. However, to impugn successfully the
constitutionality of Section 301(a), criticism should be more searching than
a mere allegation that Congress has been inept in the execution of a valid
intent to widen the jurisdiction of federal courts. The inherent power of
Congress to declare substantive rights in labor contracts affecting interstate
commerce, combined with a statement of the jurisdictional consequences of
such rights, probably encompasses the rights themselves. Therefore, what-
ever the wisdom of this new grant of federal jurisdiction, Section 301(a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act will probably not be invalidated.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RATE-MAKING: THE
"CONSTITUTIONAL FACT" DOCTRINE REFURBISHED
THE "constitutional fact" doctrine provides that administrative action
affecting constitutional rights is subject to an independent judicial determin-
ation on both the law and the facts.1 Invoked, on occasion, to obtain re-
view of findings of such agencies as licensing 2 and compensation boards,3
jurisdiction: "One of the first duties of government, however, is to provide tribunals for
administering justice to its citizens; and, if I am correct in thinking that a citizen is entitled
to have his disputes adjudicated in a tribunal of the sovereignty to which he owes allegiance,
it is unthinkable that that sovereignty should shirk its responsibility and abdicate its proper
functions because of a comparatively insignificant matter of e.pense." The Federal Jurisdic-
tion and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433,438 (1932).
* Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N. Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
1. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). See Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
38, 51 (1936) ; State ex rel. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dep't of Public Serv-
ice, 19 Wash.2d 200, 217, 142 P2d 498, 508 (1943).
For discussions mosi directly in point see Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional
Fact," 15 TEm,. L. Q. 185 (1941); Comment, 39 MICHr. L. R v. 438 (1941); Note, 50
HAnv. L. REv. 78 (1936). See also Barnett, Admndistrati c Justice and Jvdicial Self-
Restraint, 14 Miss. L. J. 305, 312 (1942) ; Cooper, Adndnistratiko Justice ad the Role of
Discretion, 47 Y.A L. J. 577, 591 (1938) ; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Rev iew
of Adininistrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. op PA. L.
REv. 1055 (1932) ; Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Dcterininations, A Sum-
wary and Evaluaion, 25 lixNx. L. REv. 588 (1941); Dickinson, The Conclusk',ness of
Administrative Fact-Deferminations Since the Ben; Avon Case, 16 P. U. Fo.r. 385, 386-7
(1935) ; Frankfurter and Hart, Rate Regulation in 13 Excc. So Scr. 104, 103 (1934).
2. Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal2d 831, 123 P2d 457
(1942).
3. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). But see General Accident F. & L. Assur.
Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 223 Wisc. 635, 271 N.W. 385 (1937).
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this doctrine has generally been applied in the field of public utility rate
disputes. 4 During the past decade, however, it has fallen into a virtual
state of atrophy.5 Nevertheless, in the case of Staten Island Edison Corp.
v. Maltbie,6 the New York Court of Appeals revitalized the doctrine in hold-
ing that when a utility alleges that rates set by the Public Service Commis-
sion are confiscatory, the utility is entitled to have the rate-deterinlnation
examined by some form of independent judicial review.7 Unclarified were
three major issues: (1) whether utility rates are the only "constitutional
facts" whose administrative determination requires such review;8 (2) the
character of the review required; (3) the precise constitutional bases of
decision. 10
In the instant case, the utility sought to enjoin the enforcement of rates
promulgated by the New York Public Service Commission after nine years
of hearings and investigation," alleging that they were confiscatory and
therefore a deprivation of property without due process of law. The court
was thus confronted with the issue of whether to limit the utility to the usual
statutory review in the nature of certiorari, which permits an examination of
the administrative record only to determine whether the Commission's find-
4. E.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) ; Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936) ; State ex rel. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Dep't of Public Service, 19 Wash.2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943).
5. Despite opportunities to apply the doctrine presented by many recent cases, the
United States Supreme Court has avoided using it. See note 20 infra.
6. 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
7. Although it is difficult to determine precisely the direct results of the court's hold-
ing, three propositions seem clear: (1) an allegation of confiscation states a good cause of
action; (2) the utility may maintain an action to enjoin enforcement of rates set by the
Commission; (3) the record of the proceedings before the Commission must be considered
by the reviewing court. The Court of Appeals did not make clear the nature of the review-
ing court's proceedings, ie., whether the court is limited to the administrative record but
can substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on the weight of the evidence, or
whether the court must relitigate the issues de novo.
The Public Service Commission's motion for clarification of the opinion in respect to
the trial de novo question has been denied. Communication to YALu LAw JoURNAL from
Public Service Commission, Oct. 15, 1947.
8. If the Court of Appeals meant that the doctrine is to be limited to rate cases, no
explanation is given for the apparent discrimination in favor of public utilities. If, on the
other hand, the court intended that the doctrine be applied generally, the administrative
disruption suggested at p. 645 infra might well become widespread. Cf. Laisne v. Califor-
nia State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942) (constitutional fact
doctrine successfully invoked to gain judicial review of licensing board's action).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See discussion at p. 641 infra.
11. The New York Public Service Commission instituted an investigation of ac-
counts and records of the Staten Island Edison Corporation in 1936, By order dated No-
vember 10, 1937, the proceeding was broadened to include an investigation of rates and
charges. On May 27, 1943, the Commission promulgated a temporary rate order which
the utility challenged by a suit in equity and a proceeding in the nature of certiorari under
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ings are supported by substantial evidence, 12 or to allow the utility to
attack the rates in a new judicial proceeding.
The Special Term had dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
statutory method of review -was an exclusive remedy and satisfied constitu-
tional requirements of due process.13 The Appellate Division reversed 14 and
the Court of Appeals affirmed 15 the reversal, holding, without elaboration,
that due process required an independent judicial determination of the facts
since the instant case was controlled by the constitutional fact doctrine laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in 1920 in Ohio Valley WMater Co.
v. Bez Avon Borough.16 The Court of Appeals did not indicate, however,
whether it is the due process clause of the Federal - or of the New York
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act. The complaint in the equity suit was dis-
missed on the ground that no question of confiscation could arise involving temporary rates
because of the recoupment provisions in the temporary rate statute. The certiorari pro-
ceeding was discontinued by stipulation. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, p. 3, and Re-
spondent's Points, p. 3, Staten Island Edison Corp. Y. Maltbie, -296 X.Y. 374, 73 N.ME2d 705
(1947).
12. The New York Public Service Law establishing the Public Service Commission
and outlining its jurisdiction and authority makes no provision for a review of its determi-
nations. A proceeding in the nature of certiorari under Article 78 of the New York Civil
Practice Act is the generally accepted method of review. 2 BE:zj3AI~, ArMD ,ImsarATVI
AoJUDICAT oN (The Dep't of Public Service) 179 (1942); 9 NE%,, Yon- STATE Con-
STITUTIONAL CONvENTION CommmmTE ProBLEms RELATING TO JUDICIAL ,AIDNIsTI" TIo
AND ORGANIZATION 830 et scq. (1938) ; see Matter of New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271
N.Y. 103, 2 N.E.2d 277 (1936). Although Civil Practice Act, § 1296, Subsec. 7, which
states the test to be applied by a reviewing court to determine whether administrative deci-
sions are sufficiently supported by evidence, talks in terms of "preponderance of proof,"
judicial gloss has converted the necessary quantum of proof into "substantial evidence." 1
BENjAmIN, op. cit. supra at 328-40; and see Jaffe, Admzinistral ve Procedure Rc-Exr-
anied: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARv. L. REv. 704, 727 et scq. (1943). See also Matter
of Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 177, 33 N.E2d 75, 82 (1941) ; Matter of
Dusinberre v. Noyes, 284 N.Y. 304, 308, 31 N.E2d 34, 36 (1940) ; Matter of Murphy v.
Valentine, 284 N.Y. 524, 526, 32 N.E.2d 537, 538 (1940).
The Staten Island Edison Corporation actually did institute a certiorari proceeding
under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act for a review of the rates here being attackecd
but did not take any steps to advance the proceeding for argument pending determination of
the instant case. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 2-3, Staten Island Edison Corp. v.
Afaltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
13. The unreported opinion may be found in Record on Appeal, p. 436, Staten Island
Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
14. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 270 App. Div. 55, 58 N.Y.S2d 818 (3d
Dep't 1945).
15. 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
16. 253 U.S. 287 (1920). For the relation of the Ben Avon case to the "constitu-
tional fact" doctrine, see Comment, 39 MicH. L. REv. 438 (1941) ; Dickinson, Crowdl v.
Benson: Judicial Review of Administratize Deterninations of Questions of "Constilu-
tiownl Fact," 80 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 1055, 1073 (1932) ; Schulman, Administrate Proced-
ire-A Survey of Suggested Reforms, 15 TE-up. L. Q. 1, 5 (1940); Note, 50 HA -I. L
REv. 78, 82 (1936).
17. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.'
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Constitution " which required this result and subsequently denied a motion
requesting a clarification of this question.'" The resulting confusion becomes
even more extensive since there are numerous indicia that the Ben Avon
holding is no longer regarded as "good law"; 20 and in the instant case appeal
to the Supreme Court seems out of the question so long as any possibility
remains that the Court of Appeals was interpreting the New York Consti-
tution. 21 Meanwhile, the New York Legislature is precluded from providing
for any other type of review than that held essential in the Staten Island
case, since the statutory review by certiorari has been held constitutionally
inadequate.
The court's summary discussion of guiding constitutional principles is
18. N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6.
19. The Public Service Commission's motion for amendment of the remittitur on
this question was denied by the Court of Appeals. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL
from Public Service Commission, Oct. 15, 1947. The court's reliance on the Ben
Avon; decision and other federal cases would seem to indicate, however, that the Federal
Constitution was the basis of decision.
20. LANDIS, THE ADmINISrATrw PROCESS 141 (1938) ; 1 BENJAmIN, oP. cit. stupra
note 12, at 343-4; Foster, Public Utilities in 1943 ANNUAL SURVY or AmERICAN LAW
273, 301, n. 77 (1943). See Barnett, szpra note 1, at 327-8; Larson, mupra note 1, at 218
and n. 124; Note, 51 YALE L. J. 680, 684 (1942). And see Public Service Commission
of New York v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 351, 353 (1944).
The Ben Avon decision was clearly reaffirmed only once by the,United States Stu-
preme Court and then only over strong objection. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). Decisions have since been handed down by the Supreme
Court in which the doctrine has been attenuated or disregarded. Compare New York v.
United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947), uith Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 298
U.S. 349 (1936). See, e.g., Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 573 (1940), 311 U.S. 570 (1941), 51 YALE L. J. 680, 683 (1942), 39 Mxcn, L.
REv. 438, 446 (1941). For further discussion of the significance of this case, see 1 BEN-
JAMIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 344 and n. 31; Barnett, supra note 1, at 325; Davis,
Judicial Emasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration: Another View, 19
TEx. L. REV. 29, 58, n. 64 (1940) ; Larson, supra note 1, at 220. See also South Chicago
Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 25 (1940); Matter of Helfrick v. Dahlstrom
Metallic Door Co., 256 N.Y. 199, 176 N.E. 141 (1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 594 (1932).
The courts of some states, however, have continued to apply the Ben Avon doctrine.
See State ex rel. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dep't of Public Service, 19
Wash.2d 200, 217, 142 P.2d 498, 508 (1943) ; Laisne v. California State Board of Op-
tometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 845, 123 P.2d 457, 465 (1942).
21. The United States Supreme Court has refused to review decisions of state courts
where it is not clear whether a federal question has been determined or whether the de-
cision was based on the state constitution. See discussion in Minnesota v. National Tea
Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) ; and see also National Tea Company v. State, 208 Minn. 607,
294 N.W. 230 (1940).
Since the instant decision is an interlocutory and not a final judgment, there is no
way for it, at its present stage, to reach the Supreme Court even if it determined the
federal question. REv. STAT. §§ 690, 705 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 344(a) (1940) limits the
appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to a review of a 'final judg-
ment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State." See Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 123 (1945).
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couched wholly in words of conclusion and therefore does not illuminate its
rationale.2 However, the emphasis placed on the need for a "judicial"
determination 2 suggests that the court did not consider the Public Service
Commission's investigation to be sufficiently "judicial" in character to render
unnecessary a wholly new consideration of the facts. In so concluding, the
Court of Appeals would seem to have ignored the procedures followed by
the Public Service Commission preliminary to prescribing rates 2- and the
statutory requirements that notice be served, ' hearings held, and records of
Commission proceedings maintained." Alternatively, the Court of Appeals
may have relied on the Ben Avon case for its theory as well as its result,
but the much criticized Ben Avon doctrine 7 (that rate-fixing is a legislative
act and therefore like all legislative acts is subject to judicial review) s
. would itself seem a shaky basis for the instant decision. Since courts review
legislative acts only to determine whether "reasonable grounds" support
them,2 but review an administrative record in search of "substantial evi-
dence" '0 (after the manner of New York's statutory certiorari proceedings),
22. "There would indeed be a very drastic limitation upon the constitutional powers
of the Supreme Court of the State if it may not enjoin an unconstitutional deprivation
of property. . . . The remedy by certiorari . . . is inadequate in the protection of con-
stitutional right and .. is lacking in due process." 296 N.Y. 374, 382, 73 N.E.2d 705, 703
(1947).
23. "[D]ue process requires independent judicial determination of the constitutional
question... ." Id. at 382, 73 N.E.2d at 707.
24. See 2 BENJAmn, op. cit. supra note 12, at 32-SO.
25. N.Y. PUBLIc SFRvicE LAw § 72. See 2 BE.,JASun;, op. cit. stpra note 12, at 44,
47-60; cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 463, 479-Si (1936).
26. N.Y. PuBLic SEvicE LAw § 16. See 2 BEJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 53,
57-58, 72.
27. Among the articles criticizing the Ben Avon case are: Albertsworth, Audicial Re-
view of Adiidnistrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court, 35 HAv. L. RE%,. 127, 139
(1921) ; Bron, The Functions of Courfs and Commissions in Public Utility Ratc Reg-
idation ; 38 HAv. L. REv. 141, 147 (1924); Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in
Rate Controversies, 27 V. VA. L. Q. 207 (1921). See prize winning essays To IWhat Ex-
tent Should the Decisions of Administrathe Bodies be Rc'iewaable by the Courts? Davis,
25 A.B.AJ. 770, 772 (1939), and Clay, id. at 940. See also Note, 50 Hmv. L. RM, 78, 82
(1936).
28. The doctrine that rate fixing is legislative originated in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). But cf. People ex rel. Central Park, N. and E. River
KR. v. Wilco-, 194 N.Y. 383, 386, 87 N.E. 517 (1909). See also Amxow & NJtins,
CAsEs ON TRrALs JUDGME S AND APIPFALs 37 (1936); DicKru so~, AD=.JisTruAm
JUSTICE AND THE SUPPEMACY OF LAW 17 et seq. (1927).
29. See People v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305, 313, 171 N.E. 72, 74 (1930); Matter of far-
burg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 212, 36 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1941); Matter of Northwestern
National Insurance Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 359, 364, 43 N.E.2d 442, 444 (1942) (dissenting
opinion). The United States Supreme Court has generally applied this test. See e.g.,
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31 (1944) ; Sage Stores Co. v. Kan-
sas, 323 U.S. 32, 36 (1944) ; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177, 191 (1938) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
30. See note 12 supra. For tests New York courts have applied in determining the
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
it would seem that the latter form of review provides a stronger safeguard
for constitutional rights.3'
Although the decision does not purport to empower the courts to establish
rates, it would seem to permit a substitution of judicial discretion for that
of the Commission on the preliminary questions of fact which determine such
technical questions as accrued depreciation, operating expenses, and rate of
return. After these vexatious problems have been settled, the establishment
of rates becomes little more than a mathematical operation 32 Judicial deter-
sufficiency of the evidence, see People ex rel. N.Y. and Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219
N.Y. 84, 113 N.E. 795 (1916), aff'd, 245 U.S. 345 (1917) (Commission's exercise of
power not arbitrary and capricious); City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Electric
Corp., 233 N.Y. 39, 49, 134 N.E. 828, 832 (1922) (court interferes only to safeguard against
arbitrary power) ; People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. of Utica v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y.
357, 370, 9 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 158 (1938) (courts ex-
amine the question whether evidence preponderates). Throughout the cases appears a
reluctance on the part of the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the agency.
See also Matter of Grade Crossings (N.Y.C.R.R.), 255 N.Y. 320, 174 9.E. 695 (1931);
Matter of City of Batavia Grade Crossings, 256 App. Div. 6, 8 N.Y.S.2d 910 (4th Dep't
1939). And see Stason, "Substantial Evidence" it; Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 1026 (1941).
31. A similar argument has been suggested against the Ben Avonr decision. DIcKIN-
sox, ADmINISTRxvT JUsTI cE AND THE SUPaMIACY OF LAW 198-9 (1927).
The necessary quantum of evidence to satisfy the "substantial evidence" requirement
appears to be greater than the amount which the court demands as sufficient to make a
legislative act "reasonable.' Compare Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282
N.Y. 256, 273, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255 (1940), with cases cited in note 29 supra.
Various considerations operate in the field of "straight" constitutional questions
which are not applied in reviewing administrative decisions, the most important being the
presumption of constitutionality accorded acts of the legislature. See Matter of Fay,
291 N.Y. 198, 206, 52 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1943) ; People v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 269, 271, 186 N.E.
694, 699 (1933), aff'd sub nom. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Subsidiary
considerations are that an intent to enact an unconstitutional statute cannot be imputed
to the legislature, see People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385, 46 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1943) ;
and that, where two meanings are reasonable, the one that sustains the statute is pre-
ferred. See People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 472, 175 N.E. 177, 180 (1931).
Since a legislative act is valid if there are reasonable grounds to support it, People
v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305, 171 N.E. 72 (1930), and since a rebuttable presumption of a
state of facts warranting legislative action arises where the constitutionality of a statute
is challenged, Noyes v. Erie & Wyoming Farmers Co-op. Corp., 281 N.Y. 187, 195, 22
N.E.2d 334, 337 (1939), it would seem that the courts themselves have narrowed the
constitutional safeguards in this field to a minimum. See Note, 36 CoL. L. REV. 283
(1936).
32. Litigation has been traditionally concerned with establishing the rate base. Sec
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) ; State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Brandeis) ; Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 586 (1942) ; and Frankfurter and Hart, supra note 1, at 109. B1t ef. Hamilton,
Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW AND CONT _ P. PROB. 321, 329 (1937) : "Now and
then a hardy soul, equipped with simple faith and a calculating machine, essays
the adventure of rates based upon the true costs of particular services. This feat is, of
course, technically impossible ..
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mination of preliminary facts would, of course, be limited to those instances
where rates fixed by the Commission are attacked as confiscatory, 33 but
the instant decision would seem to open all future New York rate-makling
to such attack.3 4 Hearings before the Commission may be transformed into
preliminary proceedings, 35 the statutory method of review may be ignored,'
and the Court of Appeals may emerge as the progenitor of rate-making
policies. A recrudescence of the very conditions which originally prompted
the establishment of the Public Service Commission might well result,n7
and forty years experience in administrative rate regulation would go by the
board."
Considerations of expediency also militate against the conclusion in the
instant case. Although complicated fact questions which arise may not be
beyond judicial comprehension,' 9 the trend has been pronouncedly one of
increased judicial deference for the expertise of administrative agencies.4 0
33. 296 N.Y. 374, 383, 73 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1947).
34. See the recent petition of the Consolidated Edison Co. to the Public Service
Commission for increases in rates. Present rates are allegedly "confiscatory" of the com-
pany's property. N.Y. Times, November 30, 1947, § 1, p. 1, Col. 6.
35. See, e.g., DIcKINsoN, An mrxsvATIVE JusTICE AND THE SUPRan.AC" OF LAw 202
(1927) ; Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Mfaltbie, 270 App. Div. 55, 65, 58 N.Y.S.2d 818, 826
(3d Dep't 1945) (dissenting opinion), 296 N.Y. 374, 385, 73 N.E.2d 705, 710 (1947) (dis-
senting opinion).
36. See Justice Elsworth's opinion dismissing the complaint at Special Term, Record
on Appeal, p. 436, Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705
(1947); and see dissenting opinion in Appellate Division, 270 App. Div. 55, 64, 58
N.Y.S.2d 818, 826 (3d Dep't 1945).
37. The corruption of New York's gas light era and the colorful campaigns waged
by Seth Low and Charles Evans Hughes against the utilities were the more immediate
reasons for establishing the Public Service Commission. See, e.g., Monroe, The Gas,
Electric Light, Vater and Street Railway Serices ins New York City, 27 AN;zALs 111,
112 et seq. (1906); MOSHR AND CRAWOrD, PUBLC UTILTY" REcULATION 21 ct seq.
(1933) ; 2 BENJAMIN, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 3.
38. For history of the Commission's development, see 2 BENJAMIN', Op. Cit. sipra
note 12, at 5 et seq. See also MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 37, c. II; Rs-
OIMENDATIONS OF COMMnISSlONERS, 1 REPORT OF COMMsISSION ON RE-1SIo.* OF THE PLT-
LIC SERVICE CommissiOs LA-W 241 (1930).
39. "Neither should the court confess its inability to comprehend and intelligently
decide the issues involved... ." Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Mfaltbie, 270 App. Div.
55, 59, 58 N.Y.S.2d 818, 821 (3d Dep't 1945).
40. The United States Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged the superiority
of administrative judgment where technical matters are involved. See, e.g., Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Raihway Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661 (1946) (National Railroad Adjustment
Board); International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLR.B, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940) (NLRB);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc, 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (FTC) ; United
States v. Louis. & Nash. R.R., 235 U.S. 314, 320 (1914) (ICC); Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (Nebraska Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment). See also NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F2d 885, 887 (C.C.A2d
1943) ; Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Mlinn. 353, 376, 72 NAy. 713, 716 (1697) ;
Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Rate Regulation, 39 IL. L. RE%. 160, 172
(1944). See generally DzcKINsoN, ADMxINISTRATnIE JUSTICE AND THE SUPr1.AC" OF
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Since litigation of this nature is protracted, 4 court calendars which are al-
ready cQngested may be further encumbered.42 Moreover, the conditions
upon which rates are based do not remain constant during the period of
litigation. As a result, such important considerations as cost of operation
and depreciation, which are themselves subjects of the litigation, can vary
to such an extent that the rates finally prescribed are no longer reasonably
applicable. Further hearings before the Commission may therefore become
necessary from which a series of new appeals could be prosecuted.
The administrative agency, well beyond its incubation stage, now oc-
cupies a position of importance and prestige and should be accorded recogni-
tion commensurate with the scope of its function." The instant case requires
a balance to be drawn between efficient and effective rate regulation on the
one hand and the safeguarding of private rights on the other. Since a review
of the administrative record for substantial evidence appears adequately to
protect the utility from arbitrary and capricious Commission action, it would
seem that, in the instant case, the utility's allegations of confiscation could
have been properly decided in the statutory judicial proceeding and the
Public Service Commission's position as a rate-making body would not have
been undermined.
LAW 60, 71, 233, 254 (1927) ; LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) ; Cooper,
supra note 1; Address by Philip Halpern, 62 REPORT OF N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N 251, 256 (1939).
Cf. Butler, The Rising Tide of Expertise, 15 FORD. L. REv. 19 (1946),
41. In the instant case, for example, there were 63 public hearings before the Com-
mission extended over a period of about eight years. The testimony consisted of 6,786
pages and 211 exhibits. Preliminary court action was begun in 1943 by the utility
company and the instant suit was instituted in 1945. Now, after two years of litigating
the procedural question, the trial court will begin to consider the merits of the ease.
A classic example of how this type of litigation may be protracted is the case of New
York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645 (1934). Action was commenced by the
Commission in 1920. Its order was served in 1924. The litigation which followed was
terminated by a United States Supreme Court decision in 1934. See Frankfurter and
Hart, supra note 1, at 109; 2 BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 180, n. 75. See also
concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 84 et seq. (1936).
42. 1 BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 338; address by Dean Shea, 62 REPORT or
N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N 259, 261 (1939). See also note 41 supra.
43. Cooper, supra note 1, at 600 et seq. (1938) ; and see LANDIS, Tn AD XNISTRA-
TMa PRocEss, Introduction and c. I (1938); DIcxINsoN, ADMINIS TWRATV JUSTICE AND
THE SUPRMACY OF LAv 15 et seq. (1927) ; Brown, The Functions of Courts and Com-
missions in Public Utility Rate Regudation, 38 H. v. L. REV. 141, 152 (1924). See Willis,
Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, The Conceptual, and the F ow-
tional, 1 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 53 (1935).
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AMENABILITY OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATORS TO SUIT
UNDER NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES*
FIRMY imbedded in Anglo-American conflict of laws doctrine is the con-
cept of an administrator' as a territorially limited personality who can
be sued in his representative capacity in the state of his appointment alone. 2
The policy underlying this immunity is said to be the desirability of a central
administration of the assets of a decedent's estate, concentrating litigation
in the decedent's domiciliary forum.3 Never free from attack, the adminis-
trator's immunity from foreign suit is today threatened by six state stat-
utes 4 which provide for substituted service on the administrator of a non-
resident motorist and which thus purport to widen the jurisdiction of six
of the forty-eight non-resident motorist statutes.5 The purpose of the non-
resident motorist statutes has been to provide a convenient forum in which
persons injured by such motorists could sue to enforce their rights But
* Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
1. The term "administrator" is used in this Note to connote the personal represen-
tative, whether administrator or executor. For purposes of the problem discussed herein,
no distinction is made between them. See McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 3M6, 148
N.E. 556, 558 (1925); STummnG, PRnncP.Es oF ConflIcT or LAws 404 (1937); RP--
STATEmENT, Co=xtcr OF LAws, introductory note to topic 1, c. 11 (1934).
2. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1841); Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436,
23 So. 44 (1898) ; Becker v. Bird, 255 Ill. App. 51 (1929) ; Neuberger v. Hart, 266 App.
Div. 612, 44 N.Y.S2d 490 (2d Dep't 1943); Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.
2d 673 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 684 (1941).
3. See Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 6 (U.S. 1841) ; Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436,
440, 23 So. 44, 45 (1898); Goomici, CoxrFacr oF LAws 4S9 (1933); RESTAT&-N;T,
CONFLICT oF LAws § 512, comment a (1934); Beale, The Progress of the Law 1919-1920,
34 HARv. L. Rnv. 50, 63 (1920).
4. Anx. STAT. § 1375 (Pope, Supp. 1944); IowA COD; §§321.493-9 (1946); MD,.
ANN. ConF art. 6632, § 106(e) (Flack, Supp. 1943) ; Mica. STAT. A.N n § 9.1701 (Supp.
1947) ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFic LAw, § 52; "Wis. STAT. § 85.05(3) (1945).
5. All the states now have non-resident motorist statutes which expand normal con-
cepts of in personam jurisdiction by providing for substituted service of process upon
non-resident motorists in suits growing out of accidents in which they are involved. The
constitutional background of these statutes involved Supreme Court validation of a state's
requirement of a driver's license, Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915),
and of a state's conditioning use of its highways by a non-resident on the latter's ap-
pointing a state officer as agent to receive service of process in actions growing out of the
operation of the motor vehicle within the state. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160
(1916). The modern form of the typical non-resident motorist statute was first enacted
in Massachusetts in 1923. MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 90, § 3A (1946). In addition to pro-
viding that use of the highways of that state by a non-resident should be deemed equiva-
lent to appointment of a state official as his attorney for service of process, the statute
also made sufficiency of service dependent upon the sending of notice and a copy of
process to the non-resident by registered mail. This statute was declared constitutional
in Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). For general treatments of such statutes see
Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 32 Mxci. L. RnM. 325 (1934);
Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. Rnv. 563 (1926).
6. Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill. App. 504, 15 N.E.2d 17 (1938) ; Scott, supra note
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since, in the absence of explicit statutory provision, courts have been unani-
mous in finding themselves without jurisdiction over the administrator of
a foreign motorist,7 the failure of the original non-resident motorist statutes
to provide for service on an administrator has tended to make suit im-
possible precisely where the plaintiff most gravely needs redress-in those
accidents so serious as to cause the tort-feasor's death.8 The current amend-
ments to six of the statutes resulted from dicta indicating that the immunity
of a non-resident motorist's administrator could be cured by legislation; 9
but the recent invalidation in Knoop v. Anderson "0 of one of these amend-
5, at 565; Legis., 20 IOWA L. R-v. 654 (1935). Financial injury to the motor accident
victim and his dependents is a serious problem. For a complete discourse on its incidents
and effects, see the symposium in 3 LAW & CONTE2.P. PROB. 465-608 (1936) ; Report by the
Commitfee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents to the Colmnbia Univbrsity
Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932) ; ef. James, Accident Liability Recon-
sidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549 (1948).
Statutes compelling security for possible liability for injuries to person or property
to be provided by bond or insurance as a condition precedent to using the highways are
another facet of the controls passed to affix financial liability upon the negligent operators
of automobiles. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 90, §§ 34A-J (1946) ; Packard v. Ban-
ton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924).
7. The courts have based their refusal on three separate grounds. The main ground
relied upon is that the statute, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly con-
strued. Warner v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1946) ; Riggs v. Schneider, 279 Ky.
361, 130 S.W.2d 816 (1939) ; Young v. Potter Title and Trust Co., 114 N.J. Law 561, 178
Atl. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 751 (1935) ; Don-
nelly v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N.E.2d 888 (1936) ; State ex rel Ledin v. Davison,
216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). The second ground invokes the rule that an agency
(that implied between the motorist and a state official) is terminated by the death of the
principal. Warner v. Maddox, mspra; Brogan v. Macklin, 126 Conn. 92, 9 A.2d 499
(1939); Riggs v. Schneider, supra; Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278
(1940) ; Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943). But see, for rule that
police power is not limited by rules of agency or contract, Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253
(1933) ; Hess v. Pawlosli, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171
S.W.2d 287 (1943); Gesell v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 604, 173 N.E. 885 (1930); RESTATfmENT,
AGENCY § 118, Comment d (1933) ; ef. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915). Thirdly,
due process grounds have been utilized on the theory that the real defendant is deceased and
hence beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Boyd v. Lemmerman, 11 N.J. Misc. 701, 168
Ati. 47 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Lepre v. Real Estate-Land Title Trust Co., 11 N.J. Misc, 887
(C.P. 1933) ; Dowling v. Winters, supra.
8. See "Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 37
Micr. L. REv. 58, 71 (1938) ; Legis., 20 IoWA L. Rsv. 654, 663 (1935) ; cases cited note 7
supra.
9. See, e.g., Riggs v. Schneider, 279 Ky. 361, 365, 130 S.W.2d 816, 818 (1939);
Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 398, 293 N.W. 278, 279 (1940); Harris v. Owens,
142 Ohio St. 379, 383, 52 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1943) ; Minehart v. Shaffer, 86 Pirrsn. LEG, J.
317, 319 (1938) ; Culp, supra note 8, at 72. But see Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div.
661, 291 N.Y. Supp. 537, 539 (2d Dep't 1936) ; Goodrich, Five Years of Conflict of Laws,
32 VA. L. Ra,. 295, 310 (1946) ; cf. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 514 (1934).
10. 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947). The only previous decision under the amended
statute is Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W. 2d 287 (1943), which accepted the
amendment almost without comment.
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ments-a statute far narrower in scope than the blanket subjection to suit
of foreign administrators held unconstitutional by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1925 "-compels reexamination of the premises underlying the
foreign administrator's traditional immunity.
In Knoop v. Anderson, the defendant foreign administrator removed to
a federal district court a tort action brought pursuant to the amended Iowa
statute; thereupon the federal court of its own motion held the amendment
invalid and dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction. The opinion of the
court emphasized the in ren nature of the proceeding for the establishment
of a claim against an administrator in his representative capacity. Personal
jurisdiction over the administrator, it was said, does not give jurisdiction to
determine the validity of a claim against the estate. Moreover, since an
administrator has no status outside the state of his appointment, a foreign
court cannot obtain jurisdiction over him in his representative capacity.
Hence, the court held, a statutory provision for substituted service upon
tle administrator of the estate of a non-resident motorist is invalid.
On looking behind the judicial syllogism to the reason for the adminis-
trator's traditionally limited status, it becomes clear that suits brought by
a foreign representative outside the jurisdiction of his appointment were orig-
inally prohibited in order to protect domestic creditors from withdrawal of
a foreign estate's domestic assets which would entail pursuit of remedies in
the foreign state, 12 where the creditors might "meet with obstructions and
inequalities in the enforcement of their own rights from the peculiarities of
local law." 13 As a concomitant, suits against a foreign administrator were
also prohibited.' 4 But this fear of unequal rights in administration was laid
to rest by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Blake v. McClung5 which
11. McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925) ; sce Thorburn N. Gates,
225 Fed. 613, 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1915) ; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 368, 128 N.E. 216,
217 (1920); cf. Riverside & Dan River Cotton MillS v. Mfenefee, 237 U.S. 189, 197
(1915) ; RESTATE-ENT, CoNnIcr or L.Lws § 43 (1934). Contra: Dewey v. Barnhouse,
75 Kan. 214, 88 Pac. 877 (1907); Craig v. Toledo A.A. Ry., 2 Ohio N.P. 64 (1895); cf.
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) ; Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915) ; Lorenzen and
Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of La's, 83 U. or PA. L. RLT. 555, 564 (1935).
See note 19 infra.
12. See Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, 258 (1883); Connor v. N.Y.N.H. & H.R.R.,
28 R.L 560, 564, 68 At. 481, 482 (1908) ; STORY, CoNFicr OF LAWS § 512 (8th ed. 1883).
13. STORY, op. cit. mpra note 12, § 512.
14. See cases cited note 2 supra. Some courts referred to this parallel limitation as an
equitable concomitant. See Fay v. Haven, 3 Metc. 109, 116 (Ifass. 1841); Thorburn v.
Gates, 103 N.Y. Misc. 292, 296, 171 N.Y. Supp. 198, 200 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Note, 24 HAM
L. REv. 664 (1911) ;cf. Laughlin v. Solomon, 180 Pa. 177, 180, 36 Ad. 704, 705 (1897);
Carey v. Storms, 20 Pa. D. & C. 75, 76 (1933) ; STORy, op. cit. mipra note 12, § 514b.
15. 172 U.S. 239 (1898) ; cf. Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934). Although the
Blake case dealt with the administration of a receivership, there is no reason why it should
not apply equally to the administration of a decedents estate. See REsTATum-.N, Co:;-
FLicr oF LAws § 497 (1934).
Denial of the right of suit by or against foreign administrators was carried over from
the English common law. See Goodwin v. Jones, 3 Mass. 514, 517 (1807) ; Vaughan Y.
1948]
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required that the claims of foreign creditors be treated equally with those
of local creditors. It would seem that with the practical basis for the rule
disappearing, the rule itself might be expected to disappear. 1 Many states,
however, still refused to allow suit by a foreign administrator, and those
permitting suit did so on grounds of comity rather than of right.17
Although thirty-three states and the District of Columbia now have stat-
utes permitting suit by foreign administrators,' it has been more difficult
to break through the technical conceptions obstructing suit against these
representatives." Foreign administrators have, it is true, frequently been
Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 5 (U.S. 1841) ; STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, § 514b. The English rule
was the result of the tacit desire to protect English creditors of foreign decedents from
being prejudiced by being forced to bring suit in foreign courts. Cf. Carter and Crost's
Case, Godb. 33, 78 Eng. Rep. 21 (C.P. 1653) ; Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 369, 24 Eng.
Rep. 1105 (Ch. 1715) ; Beavan v. Lord Hastings, 2 K. & J. 724, 69 Eng. Rep. 973 (V.C.
1856) ; CsHmn .E, PgRvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 511' (1938).
16. Thus in the-resolution of a somewhat analogous jurisdictional problem, it was not
until the courts gave primary consideration to the practicalities involved that they were
able to articulate a satisfactory body of law on the status of foreign corporations. The only
real basis of the resulting rule that a corporation doing business in a state is subject to the
process of that state is that it is socially desirable that it be so. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) ; Hinton, Substituted Service on, Non-Residents,
20 IL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1925) ; Note, The Adoption of the Liberal Theory of Foreign Cor-
porations, 79 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 956, 1119 (1931).
An indication of a trend toward a functional approach to the problem of jurisdiction
may be seen in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) ; Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) ; Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 At. 527 (1934).
Cf. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REV, 809
(1935) ; Hopkins, Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedent? Intangibles, 28 IowA
L. REv. 422, 613 (1943) ; McBaine, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: Actions Aris-
ing Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 331 (1946) ; Ross, The Shift-
ing Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MINN. L. REv. 146, 157 (1933).
17. See Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 5 (U.S. 1841); Canfield v. Scripps, 15 Cal.
App.2d 642, 645, 59 P.2d 1040, 1042 (1936) ; National Bank of Topeka v. Mitchell, 154
Kan. 276, 280, 118 P.2d 519, 522 (1941) ; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 366, 128 N.E.
216,217 (1920).
18. 3 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CorIcr OF LAws § 514.1 (1935) contains a review
of varied legislation of this kind. In addition to the statutes there cited, similar laws are
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 857 (1942) and OKL.A. STAT. ANN., tit. 58, § 262 (1938). See also
the suggested UNIFORM POWERS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES Act § 2, HANDBOOK OF T11E
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 246 (1942).
19. Under a few state statutes a foreign administrator may be sued like any non-resi-
dent. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-1708 (Supp. 1945) ; Manley v. Mayer, 68 Kan. 377, 75 Pac.
550 (1904) ; N.M. STAT. § 33-209 (1941) ; OHIo GEN. CODE § 10509-160, Craig v. Toledo
A. A. Ry., 2 Ohio N.P. 64 (1895) ; cf. S.D. CODE § 35.1103 (1939) ; see 2 WHARTON, Cox-
FLicr OF LAws 1373 (3d ed. 1905). Contra: McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 239, 148 N.E.
556 (1925) (invalidating a similar New York statute). And the same result has been
reached by the courts in at least two more states without statutory aid. Laughlin v. Solo-
mon, 180 Pa. 177, 36 Atl. 704 (1897); Keiningham v. Keiningham's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law
1330, 71 S.W. 497 (1903).
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sued in their inividual capacity,:- and occasionally in their representatie
capacity, but in practically all of the latter cases there has been property
in the forum to which in ren jurisdiction could attach.2 If there are no
assets of the decedent in the foreign state, then the plaintiff's only remedy
is to establish his claim in the jurisdiction where the estate is being admin-
istered. For, under orthodox dogma, an action against the administrator is
in the nature of a proceeding in ren, the property of the estate within the
jurisdiction of the court being considered the defendant and the adminis-
trator merely its representative.
2 2
It is generally stated that suits against a foreign administrator constitute
an interference with the domiciliary court's administration of the assets of
the estate.2 This position, however, seems untenable since, even if the
foreign jurisdiction were to allow such suits, any judgments obtained could
not be enforced directly against the assets of the estate, but would merely
establish the validity of the asserted claims. These judgments would then
have to be taken into the domiciliary state and enforced by the courts of
that state pro rata with those of other creditors.24 Hence the distribution
20. E.g., Clopton v. Booker, 27 Ark. 482 (1872) (suit asking for declaration that
executrix was trustee of Arkansas land) ; Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 Pac. 425 (1903)
(wrongful removal of assets) ; Lake v. Hardee, 57 Ga. 459 (1877) (executor having as-
sets in his possession repudiated the authority of his own state and took them out of its
power), bud cf. Hedenbergh v. Hedenbergh, 46 Conn. 30 (1878); Le-is v. McCabe, 6 Mo.
App. 600 (1878) (recovery of assets fraudulently concealed); Holzer v. Thomas, 69
NJ. Eq. 515, 61 At. 154 (Ch. 1905) (assets brought into state and used to purchase real
estate) ; Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N.Y. 70, 86 N.E. 828 (1909) (suit in equity against the
executor to prevent a failure of justice); Johnson v. Wallis, 112 N.Y. 230, 19 N.E. 653
(1889) (executor sued upon contract made with him as executor).
21. Marcy v. Marcy, 32 Conn. 308 (1864) (assets collected in state); Holmes v.
Camp, 219 N.Y. 359, 114 N.E. 841 (1916) (action to foreclose a lien); Stone v. Demarest,
67 App. Div. 549, 73 N.Y. Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1902) (foreign executor of a deceased
non-resident legatee joined as a necessary party in suit by legatee to obtain distribution of
estate); Faulkner v. Reed, 229 S.W. 945 (Te. Civ. App. 1921) (foreclosure of a judg-
ment lien); Oney v. Ferguson, 41 W. Va. 568, 23 S.E. 710 (1S95) (executor brought as-
sets into the state) ; Dowdale's Case, 6 Co. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1605) (suable to
extent of assets collected abroad and not accounted for). Cf. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143
U.S. 215 (1892) (Supreme Court refrained upon a bill of review from upsetting a judg-
ment upon a counterclaim against a foreign representative after he had brought suit under
an enabling statute) ; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1S91) (where same person was
domiciliary and ancillary executor, judgment against him at the domicile held conclusive
against him in the ancillary jurisdiction) ; Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Wall. 121 (U.S. 1870)
(foreign executor admitted as defendant-appellee upon motion).
22. See Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, 175 Fed. 667, 674 (C.C.A. 8th 1910) ; Wilson v.
Hartford Fire Insur. Co., 164 Fed. 817, 819 (C.C.A. 8th 1903) ; Sheldon's Lessee v. New-
ton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 505 (1854).
23. See note 3 supra.
24. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (U.S. 1874); Wilson v. Beard, 26 F2d 860
(C.C.A. 2d 1928) ; White v. Croker, 13 F.2d 321 (C.C.A. 5th 1926). Where an adminis-
trator brings suit in a foreign state under a statute permitting him to sue (see, e.g., note
19 s=pra), a judgment rendered against him on a counterclaim is conclusive everywhere
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of the estate would still be entirely under the control of the domiciliary
court.
However, it is usually said in support of the traditional immunity that
a judgment obtained against an administrator in a foreign jurisdiction can.
not be proved in the state of administration as a claim against the decedent's
estate. 25 Accordingly, the doctrine has it that, since other states may disre-
gard any judgment which purports to bind the administrator, such a judg-
ment must be without jurisdiction and hence a violation of due process.
2
1
This conclusion assumes that the foreign administrator is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court 2 and seems to beg the real question-can jurisdic-
tion be validly obtained? It must be remembered, moreover, that the rule
denying existence to administrators beyond the territorial limits of the ap-
pointing state was not in its inception a rule of constitutional law, but merely
a conflict of laws rule.28 This rule did not rest upon the absence of jurisdic-
tion, but arose out of the unwillingness of the courts of one state to recognize
an administrator appointed in another. The due process necessary to sup-
port the acquisition of jurisdiction would appear to be no more than com-
pliance with reasonable procedural safeguards,2 and the Supreme Court, in
and would be provable as a claim in the domiciliary state, thus "depriving" the estate of
possible assets. Lackner v. McKechney, 252 Fed. 403 (C.C.A. 7th 1918) ; Palm's Adm'rs
v. Howard, 31 Ky. Law 316, 102 S.W. 267 (1907); Hamilton v. Taylor, 13 Ohio Dec.
975 (Cin. Super. Ct. 1873).
25. Even where an administrator has appeared as party defendant in a suit in a for-
eign state, the majority rule is that such appearance is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the forum court, and any judgment rendered would not be provable in the domiciliary
state. Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.2d 92 (C.C.A. 2d 1931) ; Hargrave v. Turner Lumber
Co., 194 La. 285, 193 So. 648 (1940) ; In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W. 2d
93 (1936) ; Blodgett v. Orton, 14 Wash. 2d 270, 127 P.2d 671 (1942). But there is a sub-
stantial minority view. Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 651, 63 Atl. 18 (Ch.
1906) ; Faulkner v. Reed, 229 S.W. 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; see Chicago Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29 (1916); Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 126, 6 A.2d
499, 502 (1939). As to an administrator's domiciliary liability for a judgment rendered on
counterclaim against him when he sues in a foreign jurisdiction, see note 24 supra.
26. See note 10 spra. Recognition through comity of a decree not entitled to full
faith and credit would not, however, appear a violation of due process, Gildersleeve v.
Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (1914).
27. If jurisdiction is validly obtained, full faith and credit must be accorded the judg-
ment of the court. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 1 BEALE, A TREATISE oN THE CON-
TicT OF LAWS § 43.3 (1935) ; RFSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 430 (1934).
,28. Thorburn v. Gates, 103 N.Y. Misc. 792, 171 N.Y. Supp. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd.,
184 App. Div. 443, 171 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1st Dep't 1918).
29. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (service of process upon an
American citizen outside the country) ; Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (recital
of reasonable safeguards under a non-resident motorist statute) ; State ex te1 Cochran v.
Lewis, 118 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792 (1935) (same); Hinton, Substituted Servce on Non-
Residents, 20 ILL. L. REv. 1, 8 (1925).; Tapley, Jurisdiction and the Non-Resdnt Motor-
ist, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 278 (1939); Comment, 34 YALE L. J. 886 (1925). Require-
ments of due process are fulfilled in the case of the non-resident motorist statutes by provi-
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evaluating the due process aspects of state protective devices analogous to
the territorially limited administrator, has put main emphasis on practical
social expediency. 30
Although the dourt in the instant case had doctrinal backing for its gener-
alization that suits against an administrator are thought to be in rem, it is
equally clear that the action to establish a claim against the estate of the
decedent would, if the latter were still alive, be in personam. The proceed-
ing is not for the purpose of establishing a lien against the res-the estate-,
but is essentially an action upon a delictual claim, which is the ordinary
example of an in personam proceeding. One of the major effects of categor-
izing an action as in rem is to attain the flexible jurisdiction necessary to the
maintenance of certain types of actions."' However, in rem classification of
the instant suit serves only to defeat jurisdiction which would otherwise
attach. Permitting such classification to destroy substantive rights would
seem overly to exalt conceptual distinctions.
Restriction of an administrator to the jurisdiction of his appointment no
sions for service upon the statutory agent, and further provision that a copy of the notice
be sent to the non-resident by registered mail. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
The theory has been advanced that it is "eminently sensible and practical ... that
courts should be given very broad jurisdictional powers, and then compelled to exercise
those powers on considerations of practical convenience." Ax now Aim JAuEs, CAsEs
oN TRIALS, JuDGm Trs, AND APPEALs 399 n. 36 (1934), commenting on a case in which
jurisdiction was acquired over a non-resident individual by service on his agent vithin the
state. And see Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing BuAsnes Within a State, 32-
HARv. L. REv. 871 (1919) ; note 19 supra. The very fact that the law of wills and admin-
istrators is a creature of statute has been advanced as sufficient reason to validate any rea-
sonable changes in it which the legislature may care to make. Note, 35 Yx- L J. 371
(1926) ; ef. Davis v. Connelly, 4 B. Mon. 136, 139 (Ky. 1843).
30. Decisions of the Court in recent years have manifested a tendency to subordinate
such devices to broader national needs by means of the full faith and credit clause. This
clause was used in different cases to enable the statutory successor of a foreign insurance
company to enforce claims in a foreign state as if he were a domestic successor, Clark v.
Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934), to efface the precept that one state will not enforce the rev-
enue laws of another state, Milwaukee Cy. v. White, 296 U.S. 26S (1935), and to abolish,
"in large measure, the general principle.., by which local policy is permitted to dominate
rules of comity." Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935).
31. Justice Holmes has said that every action which affects legal relations between
persons must be in personam, with the concept of in rem being used to enable courts to
attain and ex press the nature of certain desired results. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of
Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900) ; cf. Mack v. Westbrook, 148 Ga.
690, 696, 98 S.E. 339, 343 (1919). Thus the stricture of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877), that a judgment in personam rendered against a non-resident upon constructive
service of process is a violation of due process, has in part been neutralized by reifying the
status of, for example matrimonial proceedings, discharges in bankruptcy, and probate and
accounting actions in order to attain desirable jurisdictional results. See Carey, Jurisdic-
tion Over Decedent Estates, 24 ILL. L. REv. 170, 171 (1929). Cf. Dodd, Partnership
Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 H.'v. L. Rnv. 520, 535 (1927) ;
Magruder, A Note on Parhrship Liability of Stockholders in Defectve Corporations, 40
HAsv. L. R.v. 733, 742 (1927).
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longer appears necessary for the orderly and efficient administration of dece-
dents' estates. Particularly is this true in the narrow terms of the instant
case where the even-handed enforcement of non-resident motorist statutes
would seem of greater moment than the outworn protective policy which
underlies common law territorial limitations on the administrator. 2
SUPERVISORY REVIEW OF DECISIONS GRANTING HABEAS
CORPUS: APPELLATE ENCROACHMENT ON THE WRIT'
THE common-law rule forbidding appellate review of habeas corpus pro-
ceedings I has not been prejudicial to the prisoner whose petition for release
is denied, since the denial is generally given no res judicata effect and the
prisoner can therefore renew his petition before any judge or court of com-
petent jurisdiction.' But where the petition is granted and the prisoner dis-
charged, the rule makes conclusive the decision of the court of first instance.
The unilateral effect of the rule is defended on the ground that whereas an
occasional ill-advised decision may result in the erroneous release of a crim-
inal, to permit review of the writ's issuance would bar that swift liberation of
the wrongfully imprisoned which the writ of habeas corpus was designed to
ensure.3 ,Where the common-law refusal to review habeas corpus decisions
32. Compare the interesting statement by Justice Jackson during the course of an ad-
dress, reported in 45 CoL. L. Rmv. 1, 33-4 (1945) : "[T)he Constitution has come to be
construed to permit a state to obtain jurisdiction in some of those classes of cases which
are appropriately tried in the place of the transaction despite the defendant's absence and
nonresidence."
See also Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 57 YALE L. J. 1155 (1947);
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE: L. J. 736
(1924).
* State ex rel Johnson v. Broderick, District Judge, 27 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1947).
1. Cox v. Hakes, 15 App. Cas. 506 (1890) ; Sec'y of State for Home Affairs v.
O'Brien, 1923 A.C. 603. And see cases cited note 6 infra. See also 1 BAUXLY, HABEAS
CoRpus § 60 (1913); CHURCH, HABEAS CoRpus § 386 (2d ed. 1893); HURD, HAinAS
CoRPus 568-76 (2d ed. 1876) ; Notes, 14 CoL. L. Ra,. 77 (1914), 25 HARv. L. Rmv, 460
(1912).
2. Cox v. Hakes, supra note 1; Ex Parte Partington, 13 M. & W. 679, 153 Eng. Rep.
284 (1845). Furthermore, the prisoner may obtain the equivalent of appellate review by
presenting his petition to one of the appellate courts, most of which have original jurisdic-
tion in the field of habeas corpus. See, e.g., CALIF. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 4; N. D. Cozisr. Art.
IV, § 87; PA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 3. See also 2 SPELLING, INJUNcrnoNs § 1186 (2d ed.
1901). As to decisions involving the custody of an infant, see note 15 infra.
3. This is generally advanced as the true basis for the common-law rule. See, c.g.,
State v. Towery, 143 Ala. 48, 39 So. 309 (1905) ; State v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa 373, 6
N.W. 588 (1880) ; Ex Parte Williams, 149 N.C. 436, 63 S.E. 108 (1908) ; McFarland v.
Johnson, 27 Tex. 105 (1863).
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has not been abrogated by express statutory authorization of appeals, 4
courts have, with few exceptions,5 interpreted legislative silence as an ap-
proval of the common-law doctrine and have held that the general appeal
statutes do not permit the state to appeal a pris6ner's release Nevertheless,
in a number of such states 7 appellate courts have adopted the practice of
reviewing the issuance of the writ by invoking their general power of super-
visory control over inferior courts "-thus accomplishing indirectly what
their previous appraisal of legislative intent precludes them from doing
directly.
In the recent case of State ex rel. Johnson v. .Broderick, District Judge, an
18 year old boy who had been committed to the state training school after
pleading guilty to the theft of an automobile wheel, a pair of chains and a
tire, petitioned a North Dakota district judge for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging substantial defects in pre-commitment proceedings. The
district judge filed an opinion indicating his intention of ordering the boy's
release; but, before the order was issued, the North Dakota Supreme Court,
on the petition of the Attorney General, undertook to review the lower
court's conclusions of law. Finding error, it issued a supervisory writ di-
recting the district judge to remand the prisoner to custody.
In affirming its right to review the district judge's decision under its gen-
eral supervisory power, the court in the Broderick case placed its decision on
4. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE, tit. 15, §369 (1940) (appellate court must hear the appeal
without delay); CALIF. PENAL CODE § 1506 (Deering, 1941) ; cf. Rnv. STAT. § 763 (1875),
as amended, 28 U.S.C. §463 (1940) (decision of a district or circuit judge may be ap-
pealed to circuit court of appeals, subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari).
As to the prisoner's right to release pending appeal by the state, see Note, 48 HMu'. L.
REv. 513 (1935).
5. State v. Buckham, 29 Minn. 462, 13 N.W. 902 (1882) ; Doyle Y. Common%,ealth,
107 Pa. 20 (1884); Garfinkle v. Sullivan, 37 Wash. 650, SO Pac. 188 (1905).
6. See, e.g., Weddington v. Sloan, 15 B. ion. 147 (Ky. 1854) ; Bell Y. State, 4 Gill
301 (Md. 1846) ; State v. Simmons, 112 Mo. App. 535, 87 S.AV. 35 (1905) ; State v. Ken-
nie, 24 Mont. 45, 60 Pac. 589 (1900) ; State v. Miller, 97 N.C. 451, 1 S.E. 776 (1857) ;
Wisener v. Burrell, 28 Okla. 546, 118 Pac. 999 (1911); Ex Parte Brugneaux, 51 Wyo.
103, 63 P.2d 800 (1937).
7. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 97 Ark. 243, 133 S.W. 1017 (1911); State V. Hughes,
157 La. 652, 102 So. 824 (1925) ; State v. Wurdeman, 254 Mo. 561, 163 S.M. 849 (1914);
State v. District Court, 50 Mont. 428, 147 Pac. 612 (1915); State v. District Court, 64
N.D. 399, 253 N.W. 744 (1934).
8. "The Supreme Court.. . shall have a general superintending control over all in-
ferior courts under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law." N. D.
CoxsT. Art. IV, § 86. Similar provisions are to be found in the Constitutions of Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New
fexdco, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming. A similar
power, more narrowly limited, is sometimes conferred upon intermediate appellate courts.
See, e.g., Aax. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 14; Mo. CoNsT. Art. VI, §§ 12, 23; WIs. Co.-sr. Art.
VIL § 8. In the absence of constitutional provision, the power has been conferred by stat-
ute upon both supreme and intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., KA.n. Gnn. STAT. § 20-
301 (1935) ; MfAss. ANx. LAws, c. 211, §3 (1932) ; N. H. Rv. LAws, c. 369, §2 (1942).
9. 27 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1947).
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the ground that no other form of review was possible. 10 This rationale would
seem to be more a statement of the problem than a solution, if the legislature
may validly impose limits upon an appellate court's power to review and
modify the decisions of lower courts. 1 No other form of review was possible
precisely because the same court 12 had earlier interpreted the legislature's
silence upon the subject as an indorsement of the common-law rule. Since
all forms of review are equally undesirable in the eyes of the common law,
it is difficult to see how any court could prohibit appeals, in deference to a
legislative intent to preserve the common-law doctrine, and yet conclude
that some other form of review would be permissible. Such a conclusion,
which effectually repeals the common-law rule sanctioned by the legislature,
would appear to be a usurpation of legislative functions.
1 3
In the Broderick case it seems improbable that the court could have felt
the issuance of a supervisory writ was necessary to prevent "glaring injus-
tice and irremediable injury," 14 for, although it may be conceded that
erroneous disposition of one in custody could lead to substantial social injury
if not corrected,15 the facts of the instant case present no such situation. In
10. Id. at 859.
11. "It is hornbook law that qn appellate court has only such authority and jurisdic-
tion as is conferred upon it by statute." Higgins v. Fields, 150 Ore. 528, 534, 47 P.2d 235,
237 (1935). Although there is remarkably little discussion of the proposition, similar
statements may be found in Worthington v. Morris, 212 Ala. 334, 102 So. 620 (1925) ;
South Atlantic S. S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939) ; Collection Corp. v.
Anami, 33 Haw. 911 (1936) ; In re Peterson's Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W, 751 (1912);
Ringstaff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 Va. 196, 179 S.E. 66 (1935) ; First Wisconsin
Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 218 Wis. 30, 259 N.W. 836 (1935). The constitutional provision
defining the court's appellate jurisdiction may expressly subject it to legislative limitation.
See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2; COLO. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2; N. D. CoNsT. Art. IV,
§ 86.
12. Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N.D. 166, 77 N.W. 617 (1898).,
13. This seems to have been recognized in an earlier North Dakota case, in which the
court stated: ". . . [T]his court cannot hold that it was ever intended by the legislature to
make the law governing appeals applicable to a habeas corpus case; and, before we should
hold that an order of discharge could be reviewed in any manner, some statute must be
pointed out authorizing such a review in terms." Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N.D. 166, 172, 77
N.W. 617, 620 (1898).
14. It is frequently held that a court may exercise its supervisory powers to prevent
"glaring injustice and irremediable injury" when review by appeal or writ of error is im-
possible. Litteral v. Woods, 223 Ky. 582, 4 S.W.2d 395 (1928) (loss of small money judg-
ment not enough) ; State v. District Court, 50 Mont. 428, 147 Pae. 612 (1915) (erroneous
release of incompetent from custody of guardian sufficient) ; Pickus v. Perry, 59 S.D.
350, 239 N.W. 839 (1931) (erroneous refusal to quash indictment not enough) ; State v.
Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N.W. 158 (1908) (erroneous dismissal of criminal complaint
not enough "in view of the nature of the offense, and the facility with which future prose-
cution may be maintained"). Cf. State v. Wurdeman, 254 Mo. 561, 163 S.W. 849 (1914) ;
State ex rel. Red River Brick Corp. v. District Court, 24 N.D. 28, 138 N.W, 988 (1912).
15. Notably when the proceedings test the custody of an infant, rather than of a prisoner.
Res judicata effect has been given to habeas corpus litigation over infants, thus precluding
successive petitions by the disappointed parent. In re Sneden, 105 Mich. 61, 62 N.W. 1009
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any event, possible danger to the community was clearly remediable, and
in a manner apparently intended by the legislature,' G through the reinstitu-
tion of criminal proceedings against the released prisoner. On the other
hand, if the court was primarily concerned with correcting the district
judge's erroneous interpretation of the law, this could have been accom-
plished in an opinion pointing out the district judge's errors, but denying
the supervisory writ on the ground that it was unavailable for review of
habeas corpus proceedings.
17
(1895) ; State v. Bechdel, 37 Minn. 360, 34 NAV. 334 (1887) ; Knapp v. Tolan, 26 NJ).
23, 142 NAV. 915 (1913). And the distinction has been held material in deciding whether
the decision of the lower court may be reviewed. McKercher v. Green, 13 Colo. App. 270,
58 Pac. 406 (1899) ; State v. Miller, 97 N.C. 451, 1 S.E. 776 (1887) (statute permitted ap-
peal in habeas corpus only where the issue was custody of a child) ; Tate v. Tate, 163 La.
1047, 113 So. 370 (1927). See also CiuRcH, HABEAs Copus § 387 (2nd ed. 1893); 2
FRE Ax, JuDGmENTs § 827 (5th ed. 1925).
16. "No person who has been discharged by the order of the court upon habeas corpus
can be imprisoned again or kept in custody for the same cause, except in the following
cases:
1. If he has been discharged from custody on a criminal charge and is com-
mitted afterwards for the same offense, by legal order or process;
2. If, after a discharge for defect of proof, or for any defect of the process,
warrant, or commitment in a criminal action, the accused is arrested again
on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same offense.
N. D. Rav. CODE, § 32-2227 (1943).
17. This is precisely the course which the same court followed in an earlier case, State
ex reL. Shafer v. District Court, 49 N.D. 1127, 194 N.W. 745 (1923). Carefully pointing
out that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in dismissing a criminal indictment, the
court nevertheless refused to issue a supervisory writ on the ground that the legislature
clearly intended the institution of new proceedings to be the only remedy: "Whether or
not, under a Constitution such as ours, this court must in all circumstances when applica-
tions are made appealing to its power of superintending control, exercise an independent
judgment entirely apart from the judgment which has been expressed by the Legislature,
may well be open to serious question." Id. at 1136, 194 N.W. at 749.
The views expressed in the Shafer case seem'to have been repudiated, by implication,
in the subsequent case of Goodman v. Christensen, 71 N.D. 306, 300 N.W. 460 (1941).
The court there admitted that "i]t was evidently the intention of the legislature to make
the decision of the district judge final as to those matters which he was required to deter-
mine under the provisions of Chapter 269 [relating to appeals from decisions of county
assessment boards] . . ." but held that "this court is not deprived of superintending con-
trol." Id. at 310, 300 N.W. at 462.
19481
